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SCHREMS II AND TIKTOK: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
David A. Hoffman*
Facebook and TikTok have both experienced considerable
skepticism of whether individuals can trust the companies’ privacy
and data protection practices. These concerns are in part due to the
potential for government agencies to access the data the companies
collect and store. The European Union and the United States have
both attempted to address these issues around potential government
access to the companies’ data by using different legal mechanisms
to prohibit the international transfer of data. The Court of Justice of
the European Union has ruled twice now that the United States does
not provide an adequate level of protection for personal data of
Europeans and therefore invalidated the legal basis that Facebook
has used for its transatlantic data transfers. Similarly, the United
States has attempted to use national security legal authorities to
prohibit TikTok from transferring U.S. citizens’ personal data to
China. Both of these situations raise important questions as to how
countries, companies, and individuals can evaluate whether they
should trust technology that can collect personal data and transfer
that data to another country. Neither the U.S approach nor China’s
approach to address the issue provide a scalable framework for the
trust of technology. However, the Organization of Economic
Coopearation and Development has begun efforts to develop such a
model.
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I.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
What could teenagers creating videos of themselves dancing
have to do with national security? Perhaps quite a bit. TikTok and
Facebook have become fundamental components of many peoples’
lives. In a press release issued in August of 2020, TikTok announced
it had more than 100 million active U.S. users.1 Industry analysts
have reported that there have been 2.6 billion downloads of the
TikTok app from Google Play and the Apple App Store.2 Analysts
similarly report that, as of October of 2020, Facebook has 2.7 billion
active global users,3 410 million of whom are located in Europe.4
Facebook’s impact on privacy has been well documented,5 including
a $5 billion fine from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).6
Recently, former U.S. National Security Agency (“NSA”) General
Counsel, Glenn Gerstel, also warned about the national security
implications of Facebook.7 Similarly, researchers are now observing

1

Why We are Suing the Administration, TIKTOK (Aug. 24, 2020), https://
newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktok-files-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/VL6E-XWH6].
2
Stephanie Chan, TikTok Was the Best-Rated of 2020’s Top U.S. iOS Apps,
SENSORTOWER, INC. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://sensortower.com/blog/top-ratedapps-2020 [https://perma.cc/8XUR-X8P8].
3
Salman Aslam, Facebook by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts,
OMNICORE (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebook-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/H3JY-2XG6].
4
H. Tankovska, Facebook’s Monthly Active Users (MAU) in Europe from 4th
Quarter 2012 to 4th Quarter 2020, STATISTA (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/745400/facebook-europe-mau-by-quarter/ [https://perma.cc/S7WL-A763].
5
See
Facebook
Privacy,
EPIC,
https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/
[https://perma.cc/X7VE-RL34] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
6
Lesley Fair, FTC’s $5 billion Facebook settlement: Record-breaking and
history-making, FTC (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/
business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breaking-history
[https://perma.cc/8DRA-VPZB].
7
Glenn S. Gerstell, The National-Security Case for Fixing Social Media, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/
the-national-security-case-for-fixing-social-media [https://perma.cc/FG8C-NKJ5].
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the use of TikTok not just for dancing, but also for political
engagement.8
The U.S. government has expressed concern about the amount
of data relating to U.S. citizens that TikTok may transmit back to
China, which would be accessible by Chinese government
authorities.9 Similarly, European courts have ruled that the ability of
U.S. government authorities to access the data of European
Facebook users is a violation of those users’ rights under European
law.10 Both of these concerns arise from the question of whether
users of these applications can trust them.11 A recent survey found
that eighty-five percent of Americans believe that a technology
company is spying on them.12 In that survey, Facebook and TikTok
were the two companies that respondents most often believed were
spying on their users (sixty-eight percent and fifty-three percent,
respectively).13
In November of 2019, TikTok U.S. General Manager Vanessa
Pappas sent a letter to Congress attempting to address these concerns
in which she stated:
We know that our users want to feel secure and informed when it comes
to handling their data. Recognizing the importance of this issue, we want
to be as transparent as possible in order to earn the trust and confidence
8

See, e.g., How TikTok is Shaping Politics: A New York Times Q&A With TC’s
Ioana Literat, TCHRS. COLL., COLUM. UNIV. (June 29, 2020), https://
www.tc.columbia.edu/articles/2020/june/how-tiktok-is-shaping-politics/
[https://perma.cc/Q59A-PVJ3].
9
Commerce Department Prohibits WeChat and TikTok Transactions to Protect
the National Security of the United States, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200918121401/https:/www.commerce.gov/news/
press-releases/2020/09/commerce-department-prohibits-wechat-and-tiktoktransactions-protect [https://perma.cc/RPP4-KBH6].
10
Data Protection Comissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. & Schrems [2020]
C‑311/18 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
11
See Larry Dignan, Facebook, TikTok Least Trusted by Americans, Google
Most Trusted, Says Survey, ZDNET (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.zdnet.com/
article/facebook-tiktok-least-trusted-by-americans-google-most-trusted-sayssurvey/ [https://perma.cc/6QU4-GU2A].
12
Angelo Ilumba, Most Americans Think Big Tech Is Spying On Them,
WHISTLEOUT (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.whistleout.com/CellPhones/Guides/
americans-think-companies-are-spying [https://perma.cc/Q48B-UBWX].
13
Id.
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of our US stakeholders in this crucial area. As we have said before, and
recently confirmed through an independent security audit, we store all
US user data in the United States, with backup redundancy in Singapore.
TikTok’s data centers are located entirely outside of China. Further, we
have a dedicated technical team focused on adhering to robust
cybersecurity policies, and data privacy and security practices. In
addition, we periodically conduct internal and external reviews of our
security practices in an effort to ensure we are keeping up with current
risks.14

However, recent reporting that TikTok has been sending U.S.
job applicant data to China has created additional concerns about
whether TikTok can be trusted to live up to those commitments.15
Commentators have noted in discussions of the trustworthiness of
Huawei, another Chinese technology company, that the ability of
technology companies to send software updates at any time presents
the risk of Chinese government access to data collected, processed,
and stored by those technologies.16
TikTok’s potential access to personal data raises privacy
concerns and national security risks.17 With advanced analytics and
the potential to collect data that includes location information, social
relationships, and details of the private lives of government officials
and employees of critical infrastructure operators, officials express
14

Vanessa Pappas, Explaining TikTok’s Approach in the US, TIKTOK (Nov. 5,
2019), https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/explaining-tiktoks-approach-in-the-us
[https://perma.cc/KPZ8-464D].
15
@msmash, TikTok Has Been Quietly Sending Job Applicants’ Personal Data to
China, SLASHDOT (Dec. 16, 2020), https://tech.slashdot.org/story/20/12/16/
1414230/tiktok-has-been-quietly-sending-job-applicants-personal-data-to-china
[https://perma.cc/RGW2-ZHXA].
16
The concerns in Huawei go well beyond just access to personal data and
extend to disruption of critical infrastructure. See Colin Lecher & Russell
Brandom, Is Huawei a Security Threat? Seven Experts Weigh In, VERGE (Mar.
17, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/17/18264283/huawei-securitythreat-experts-china-spying-5g [https://perma.cc/D6TQ-LEAV].
17
See Bill Whitaker, Is TikTok a Harmless App or a Threat to U.S. Security?,
CBS NEWS (Nov. 15, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tiktokcybersecurity-china-60-minutes-2020-11-15/ [https://perma.cc/5VPR-57GM].
See also Huileng Tan, TikTok is ‘Caught in the Middle’ as the U.S. is ‘Deeply
Suspicious’ of China, Analyst Says, CNBC (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/04/tiktok-is-caught-in-the-middle-as-the-us-isdeeply-suspicious-of-china-analyst-says.html [https://perma.cc/WJV3-WLVS].
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concern about what the Chinese government could learn, especially
when combining the data with information obtained from
cybersecurity attacks on the United States, such as the attack on the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management.18 For example, it could be
possible to isolate individuals who have high level U.S. government
security clearances and then analyze the TikTok posts of their family
members to understand their social connections, locations, schools,
and videos from inside their homes. There are also concerns that the
Chinese government could use TikTok to send misleading
information to targeted users in an attempt to sway public opinion
in the United States.19 Other experts express reservations on the
extent or likelihood of these risks, but they do not dispute that they
are possible.20
European concerns about Facebook are similar. Beginning in
2010, Facebook began constructing data centers to manage the large
amounts of data it collects and stores.21 That first data center was in
Prineville, Oregon.22 Facebook now has a much more complicated
data center infrastructure.23 As of September of 2020, Facebook has
seven data centers in the United States with plans for three more.24
The company also operates three data centers in Europe in Sweden,

18

Kevin Collier, China Spent Years Collecting Americans’ Personal
Information. The U.S. Just Called It Out., NBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/china-spent-years-collecting-americanspersonal-information-u-s-just-n1134411 [https://perma.cc/P7AV-ZBWX].
19
See Brian Fung, TikTok is a National Security Threat, US Politicians Say.
Here’s What Experts Think, CNN BUS. (July 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/07/09/tech/tiktok-security-threat/index.html [https://perma.cc/9BAS-ZHAE].
20
See Justin Sherman, Building a Better U.S. Approach to TikTok and Beyond,
LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/improving-tech-policy
[https://perma.cc/3Q5D-K3FE].
21
The Facebook Data Center FAQ, DATACENTER KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 27,
2010), https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/data-center-faqs/facebook-datacenter-faq [https://perma.cc/6FKH-FEVH].
22
Id.
23
See Yevgeniy Sverdlik, Facebook Plans Huge Expansion of Already Massive
Georgia Data Center, DATACENTER KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/facebook/facebook-plans-hugeexpansion-already-massive-georgia-data-center [https://perma.cc/6AHS-QWLR].
24
Id.
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Denmark, and Ireland.25 The company also leases data center
capacity in the United States, Europe, and Singapore.26 However,
even with data centers in Europe, Facebook operates its business by
transferring data from the European Union (“EU”) to the United
States.27 European citizens have expressed concern about these
transfers of data, specifically about U.S. law allowing government
agencies to be able to access that data and apply advanced analytics
to infer information about individuals in the EU.28
The potential for government access to Facebook and TikTok
data has led to legal efforts in the EU and the United States to
mitigate the perceived risks. These legal mechanisms are worth
reviewing in depth to compare their ability to reduce the risks and
the degree to which they will have unintended consequences for
innovation and the global economy. This Article will first look at
the legal actions brought in the EU against Facebook under
European data protection laws and will analyze the reasons given
for why United States government surveillance legal authorities
create a legal structure that does not provide adequate protection for
the personal data of Europeans. This Article will then explore the
recent actions taken against TikTok in the United States based on
concerns that TikTok may transfer U.S. persons’ data to China.
Finally, this Article will compare the Facebook and TikTok
situations and propose recommendations for a better approach.
II.
FACEBOOK AND MAX SCHREMS
In 2012, University of Vienna law student Max Schrems spent a
semester at Santa Clara Law School in California.29 One of
25

Id.
Id.
27
Facebook EU Data Transfer Addendum, FACEBOOK (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/legal/EU_data_transfer_addendum [https://perma.cc/4VJ8QPFD].
28
Owen Bowcott, Facebook Case may Force European Firms to Change Data
Storage Practices, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/sep/23/us-intelligence-services-surveillance-privacy [https://perma.cc/
D5ZZ-QR6G].
29
Kashmir Hill, Law Student of the Day: Max Schrems, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb.
8, 2012), https://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/law-student-of-the-day-max-schrems/
[https://perma.cc/RC8T-6LFQ].
26
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Schrems’s law professors invited Facebook attorney Ed Palmieri to
speak with the class.30 Schrems was surprised by how little
understanding the Facebook attorney had of European privacy law.31
After writing his class paper about Facebook’s lack of knowledge of
European privacy law, Schrems returned to Austria and submitted a
request to Facebook under the Austrian privacy law to receive the
personal data Facebook held about him.32 In response to his request,
Facebook sent Schrems a 1,200-page report of all of its data relating
to him.33 Kashmir Hill, a journalist now at The New York Times,
reported in Forbes that the data in Facebook’s response included:
[E]veryone he had ever friended and de-friended, every event he had ever
been invited to (and how he responded), a history of every “poke” he had
ever received, a record of who else signed onto Facebook on the same
computers as him, email addresses that he hadn’t provided for himself
(but that must have been culled from his friends’ contact lists) and all of
his past messages and chats, including some with the notation
“deleted.”34

On June 6, 2013, Glenn Greenwald published a story in the
Guardian alleging access to government documents that showed that
the NSA had conducted a surveillance program to collect phone
metadata records on millions of users of Verizon
telecommunications services in the United States.35 One day later,
the Guardian and Washington Post both published stories describing
documents that allegedly showed a program called PRISM that
provided direct access for the NSA to servers at technology

30

Kashmir Hill, Max Schrems: The Austrian Thorn In Facebook’s Side,
FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/
the-austrian-thorn-in-facebooks-side/?sh=30b626017b0b [https://perma.cc/BT4R3R5R].
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/R57EXGZW].
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companies including Facebook.36 On June 8, 2013, U.S. Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper released a fact sheet about
PRISM.37 The fact sheet asserted that the U.S. government did not
have direct access to technology company servers.38 Instead,
Clapper described PRISM as a program under Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) that provides
requests for information to the technology companies:
With FISA Court approval and with the knowledge of the provider based
upon a written directive from the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence. In short, Section 702 facilitates the targeted
acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning foreign
targets located outside the United States under court oversight. Service
providers supply information to the Government when they are lawfully
required to do so.39

It was soon revealed that the documents referenced in the
Guardian and Washington Post stories had been leaked by former
government contractor Edward Snowden.40 Max Schrems has stated
that the Snowden disclosures made a significant impact on him, as

36

Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
[https://perma.cc/FX39-GQP5]; Barton Gellman, U.S., British Intelligence
Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program,
WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/usintelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secretprogram/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7GR5-3NXK].
37
OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., FACTS ON THE COLLECTION OF
INTELLIGENCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT, 1–3 (June 8, 2013), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Facts%20on%20the%20Collection%20of%20Intelligence%20Pursuant%20to%20
Section%20702.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9EH-FLN6].
38
Id. at 1.
39
Id.
40
Glenn Greenwalk et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the
NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsawhistleblower-surveillance [https://perma.cc/72VR-WU4F].
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he realized that the information Facebook had about him and others
in the EU was accessible by the NSA.41
With inspiration from Edward Snowden, Schrems soon focused
his complaints about Facebook on whether Facebook’s transfers of
personal data to the United States were legitimate under the then
existing law in Europe, The Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data (“the Directive”).42
Article I of the Directive provides the dual objectives of the law
as:
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular
their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of
personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the
protection afforded under paragraph 1.43

As noted in the second objective, the Directive provides for the
free flow of data within EU member states. One mechanism it uses
to accomplish the first objective is to restrict the transfer of personal
data to other countries. Article 25, Section 1 of the Directive
provides that companies can only transfer personal data when “the
third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.”44
Section 2 of Article 25 then provides criteria for how the
Commission should determine whether the other country’s
protection is adequate.45
41
Hannah Kuchler, Max Schrems: The Man Who Took on Facebook — and
Won, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/86d1ce50-379911e8-8eee-e06bde01c544 [https://perma.cc/8VSC-4ET5].
42
Id.
43
2000 O.J. (L 215) at Article I. The Directive has not been superseded by the
E.U. General Data Protection Regulation, but the objectives and restrictions on
international data transfers have been incorporated into the regulation.
44
Id. at Article 25, Section 1.
45
Id. at Article 25, Section 2. In Article 26, the Directive also provides a number
of derogations to the adequacy requirement including consent of the individual
and the necessity of transfer to the performance of a contract. However, an
adequacy decision was and is under the current General Data Protection
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The Directive was designed to come into effect in October 1998,
at which time member states were required to incorporate at least
the minimum standards of the Directive into their country-specific
data protection and privacy laws.46 Shortly thereafter, the United
States began negotiations with the European Commission to put in
place a framework to allow the Commission to find whether United
States was providing an adequate level of protection of the privacy
interests of individuals in the EU.47 The resulting agreement was
titled the Safe Harbor Principles, and the European Commission
issued a decision on July 26, 2000, that the framework satisfied the
adequacy requirements of the Directive.48
The Safe Harbor Principles included a specific provision related
to access to the data by law enforcement: “Adherence to these
Principles may be limited: (a) to the extent necessary to meet
national security, public interest, or law enforcement
requirements.”49
The Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQ”) that were
incorporated into the Safe Harbor Principles by the decision also
identify that the likelihood of interfering with national security or
defense is an exception to providing access to information:
5. A: Such circumstances are limited, and any reasons for denying access
must be specific. An organization can refuse to provide access to
information to the extent that disclosure is likely to interfere with the
safeguarding of important countervailing public interests, such as
national security; defense; or public security. In addition, where personal
information is processed solely for research or statistical purposes,
access may be denied. Other reasons for denying or limiting access are:
a. interference with execution or enforcement of the law, including the
prevention, investigation or detection of offenses or the right to a fair
trial.50

Regulation the most comprehensive way to legally authorize transfers of personal
data from the European Union to other countries.
46
O.J. (L 215) Article 4(1).
47
MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44257, U.S.EU DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 5 (2020).
48
O.J. (L 215), supra note 46 at Article 1(1).
49
Id. at Annex I.
50
Id. at Annex I, FAQ 8 - Access, 5-5(a).
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As a result of these provisions, most companies included a
statement in their privacy policies notifying individuals that the
company may provide access to information when required by law.51
It was this ability for law enforcement to access personal data under
the Safe Harbor Principles that formed the basis for the European
Court of Justice’s decision in what is now commonly referred to as
the Schrems I case.52 In that decision, the Court invalidated the
European Commission’s adequacy decision for the Safe Harbor
Principles on the basis of concerns about a lack of controls for U.S.
government access to the data held by Facebook.53
In the Schrems I opinion, the Court provided the first
interpretation of the obligation of “adequacy” to be defined as
“essential equivalence” to the provisions of the Directive, “read in
light of the Charter”:
The word ‘adequate’ in Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46 admittedly
signifies that a third country cannot be required to ensure a level of
protection identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order. However,
as the Advocate General has observed in point 141 of his Opinion, the
term ‘adequate level of protection’ must be understood as requiring the
third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its
international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the
European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the light of the
Charter. If there were no such requirement, the objective referred to in
the previous paragraph of the present judgment would be disregarded.
Furthermore, the high level of protection guaranteed by Directive 95/46
read in the light of the Charter could easily be circumvented by transfers
of personal data from the European Union to third countries for the
purpose of being processed in those countries.54

This reference to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (“the Charter”) broadens the analysis of adequacy
51

For many companies, these insertions were already included in their privacy
policies as it had been a long- accepted practice to provide notice to individuals
that information may be provided to law enforcement and other government
agencies when required by law. Privacy Policy, AICPA (June 4, 2019),
https://www.aicpa.org/privacyandterms/privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/84S8XZ55] (provising as example of industry best practice recommendations).
52
Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r [2015], ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 1-2 (H.Ct.)
(Ir.).
53
Id. at ¶ 106.
54
Id. at ¶ 73.
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beyond just the provisions of the Directive, which specifically
exempts uses of personal data for law enforcement and national
security.55 Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter dictate the privacy and data
protection rights of individuals in the EU.56 Article 7 states that
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family
life, home and communications.”57 Article 8 provides in part
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her” and further that the “data must be processed
fairly” and “[e]veryone has the right of access . . . and the right to
have it rectified.”58
The Court then determined that the United States did not have
appropriate legislative protections governing the collection of
personal data for national security purposes.
Moreover, the foregoing analysis of Decision 2000/520 is borne out by
the Commission’s own assessment of the situation resulting from the
implementation of that decision . . . the Commission found that the
United States authorities were able to access the personal data transferred
from the Member States to the United States and process it in a way
incompatible, in particular, with the purposes for which it was
transferred, beyond what was strictly necessary and proportionate to the
protection of national security. Also, the Commission noted that the data
subjects had no administrative or judicial means of redress enabling, in
particular, the data relating to them to be accessed and, as the case may
be, rectified or erased.59

Other sections of the opinion further provided that permitting
authorities to have access to personal data on a “generalised basis,”
or in situations where the individual does not have an adequate
ability to pursue legal remedies, can cause a framework to fail the
test of essential equivalence.60 The Court specifically called out the
PRISM program, which it described as a “large-scale intelligence
[program,]” finding that it was “beyond what is strictly necessary
and proportionate to the protection of national security.”61 The
55

2012 O.J. (C 326) 395.
Id. at 397.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r [2015], ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 90 (H.Ct.)
(Ir.).
60
Id. at ¶¶ 94–95.
61
Id. at ¶ 22.
56
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opinion also states “there are no opportunities for either EU or US
data subjects to obtain access, rectification or erasure of data, or
administrative or judicial redress with regard to collection and
further processing of their personal data taking place under the US
surveillance programmes.”62
The Schrems I opinion’s specific mention of PRISM and the
risks from large-scale access highlight concerns about how the U.S.
intelligence agencies will use the personal data of individuals in the
EU. The Court notably did not include any discussion of the controls
that U.S. law applies to the use of that data by the relevant
intelligence agencies, including the detail provided in Director of
National Intelligence Clapper’s letter.63 The United States has
arguably the most comprehensive and complicated oversight
structure of its foreign surveillance activities, including Inspectors
General, Congressional committees, a specially created federal
court of life-tenured judges, and significant data minimization and
reporting requirements.64 The Schrems I case’s lack of discussion of
these controls called into question the Court’s overall analysis of
whether the collection and processing of data under Section 702 was
sufficiently proportionate.
The Schrems I decision sent shockwaves throughout the privacy
legal community and the U.S. government, due to the potential to
disrupt transatlantic commerce.65 Since the Snowden disclosures,
there had been considerable calls for reform of U.S. surveillance
legal authorities, including Section 702.66 U.S. companies quickly
pivoted to the use of other European Commission-approved
62

Id. at ¶ 23.
See OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 37.
64
Director’s Report on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts’ Activities,
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 1, 2 (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/analysis-reports/directors-report-foreign-intelligencesurveillance-courts [https://perma.cc/9J26-ZYLU].
65
See, e.g., Max Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (CJEU - “Safe
Harbor”), EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/intl/schrems/ [https://perma.cc/Y772TGRT] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
66
Spencer Ackerman, Snowden Disclosures Helped Reduce use of Patriot Act
Provision to Acquire Email Records, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2016, 3:34 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/29/edward-snowdendisclosures-patriot-act-fisa-court [https://perma.cc/HY99-YMRG].
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mechanisms for transfer of data, such as Binding Corporate Rules
and Standard Contractual Clauses.67 The U.S. government and the
European Commission entered into negotiations for a new
agreement in an attempt to cure the Safe Harbor Principles
deficiencies called out by the Schrems I decision.68 On February 29,
2016, the two parties entered into a new agreement called the
Privacy Shield, which was formally adopted on July 12, 2016.69
The Privacy Shield strengthened many aspects of privacy
protection over transferred data, such as increased oversight and
enforcement by the European Commission and the FTC, new
complaint processes (including an Ombudsperson position reporting
to the State Department to shepherd requests for information),70 and
the creation of an annual review process to create transparency on
implementation of the agreement.71 The documents adopted by the
European Commission included several letters from U.S.
government officials describing in detail the privacy protections
available under U.S. law.72 Two of these letters were from Robert
Litt, the then-General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.73 The letters provide a thorough description of
U.S. national security intelligence collection authorities, including
overviews of FISA Section 702, Presidential Policy Directive 28
(“PPD-28”), the function of the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, the role of Inspectors General, and the USA
67

SCHREMS ECJ / SAFE HARBOR RULING – FAQS, ALSTON & BIRD 5,
https://www.alston.com/files/docs/Safe-Harbor-FAQs.PDF
[https://perma.cc/386T-EUSH] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
68
John Sander, U.S. and EU Negotiationg New Data Transfer Agreement to
Replace Invalid Safe Harbor, SHRM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/
resourcesandtools/hr-topics/global-hr/pages/u.s.-and-eu-negotiating-new-datatransfer-agreement-.aspx [https://perma.cc/H6WV-MCZE].
69
European Commission Press Release IP/16/433, Restoring Trust in
Transatlantic Data Flows Through Strong Safeguards: European Commission
Presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 29, 2016); Commission Implementing
Decision (EU) 2016/1250, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 3.
70
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, supra note 69, at
annex A, 72.
71
Id. at annexes IV, V, VI, 78–108.
72
See id. at annex VI, 91–108.
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Freedom Act.74 In the conclusion of the first letter, Litt provides the
following defense of the level of privacy protections for individuals
outside the United States:
The United States recognizes that our signals intelligence and other
intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be
treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or place
of residence, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the
handling of their personal information. The United States only uses
signals intelligence to advance its national security and foreign policy
interests and to protect its citizens and the citizens of its allies and
partners from harm. In short, the IC does not engage in indiscriminate
surveillance of anyone, including ordinary European citizens. Signals
intelligence collection only takes place when duly authorized and in a
manner that strictly complies with these limitations; only after
consideration of the availability of alternative sources, including from
diplomatic and public sources; and in a manner that prioritizes
appropriate and feasible alternatives. And wherever practicable, signals
intelligence only takes place through collection focused on specific
foreign intelligence targets or topics through the use of discriminants.
U.S. policy in this regard was affirmed in PPD-28. Within this
framework, U.S. intelligence agencies do not have the legal authority,
the resources, the technical capability or the desire to intercept all of the
world’s communications. Those agencies are not reading the emails of
everyone in the United States, or of everyone in the world. Consistent
with PPD-28, the United States provides robust protections to the
personal information of non-U.S. persons that is collected through
signals intelligence activities. To the maximum extent feasible consistent
with the national security, this includes policies and procedures to
minimize the retention and dissemination of personal information
concerning non-U.S. persons comparable to the protections enjoyed by
U.S. persons. Moreover, as discussed above, the comprehensive
oversight regime of the targeted Section 702 FISA authority is
unparalleled. Finally, the significant amendments to U.S. intelligence
law set forth in the USA FREEDOM Act and the ODNI-led initiatives to
promote transparency within the Intelligence Community greatly
enhance the privacy and civil liberties of all individuals, regardless of
their nationality.75

However, even before the Privacy Shield was formally adopted
by the European Commission, experts were already predicting that
74
75

Id.
Id. at annex VI, 103–04.
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the U.S. government surveillance reforms may not be enough to
satisfy the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”).76 These concerns
proved prescient as Schrems quickly amended his existing
complaint to challenge Facebook’s transfers of data to the United
States, based on the company’s assertion that the bulk of those
transfers were done using European Commission-approved
Standard Contractual Clauses (“SCC”), and those protections were
insufficient to provide essentially equivalent privacy protection.77
In an opinion now known as Schrems II, the CJEU generally
upheld the use of the SCC but significantly found that the Privacy
Shield did not meet the standard of essential equivalence to justify
an adequacy determination under European law.78 Moreover, the
CJEU noted that the use of the SCC would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each transfer, including the likelihood that those
transfers may be accessed by a non-EU government agency.79
In the Schrems II decision, the Court specifically rejected three
arguments made in Litt’s letter, by concluding: (1) the collection
was not targeted; (2) there is not an independent tribunal; and (3) the
Ombudsperson does not have the necessary independence and is not

76

Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, EU-US Privacy Shield Offers Partial Response to a
Wider Issue, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://cdt.org/
insights/eu-us-privacy-shield-offers-partial-response-to-a-wider-issue/
[https://perma.cc/TS2R-C84Z].
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Davina Garrod, et al., The Case of Schrems 2.0 – the Challenge to Standard
Contractual Clauses Allowing Personal Data Transfer Outside the European
Union, AKIN GUMP: AG DATA DIVE (July 10, 2019), https://www.akingump.com/
en/experience/practices/cybersecurity-privacy-and-data-protection/ag-datadive/the-case-of-schrems-2-0-the-challenge-to-standard-contractual.html
[https://perma.cc/DG7D-4HSW].
78
Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd (Schrems II),
ECLI:EU:C: 2020:559, ¶ 181 (July 16, 2020).
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Id. at ¶¶ 132–33. The European Data Protection Board has subsequently
published a paper to describe what supplementary protections may need to be put
in place to justify a transfer. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS 01/2020 ON MEASURES THAT SUPPLEMENT TRANSFER
TOOLS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF
PERSONAL DATA (Nov. 10, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/
consultation/edpb_recommendations_202001_supplementarymeasurestransfersto
ols_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/G23D-GC5J].
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sufficiently empowered to enforce decisions.80 First, the Court
explicitly disagreed that intelligence collection under Section 702
was targeted, and therefore failed the principle of proportionality:81
In that regard, as regards the surveillance programmes based on Section
702 of the FISA, the Commission found, in recital 109 of The Privacy
Shield Decision, that, according to that article, “the [Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”)] does not authorise individual surveillance
measures; rather, it authorises surveillance programs (like PRISM,
UPSTREAM) on the basis of annual certifications prepared by the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)”. As
is clear from that recital, the supervisory role of the FISC is thus designed
to verify whether those surveillance programmes relate to the objective
of acquiring foreign intelligence information, but it does not cover the
issue of whether “individuals are properly targeted to acquire foreign
intelligence information”.
It is thus apparent that Section 702 of the FISA does not indicate any
limitations on the power it confers to implement surveillance
programmes for the purposes of foreign intelligence or the existence of
guarantees for non-US persons potentially targeted by those
programmes. In those circumstances and as the Advocate General stated,
in essence, in points 291, 292 and 297 of his Opinion, that article cannot
ensure a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by
the Charter, as interpreted by the case-law set out in paragraphs 175 and
176 above, according to which a legal basis which permits interference
with fundamental rights must, in order to satisfy the requirements of the
principle of proportionality, itself define the scope of the limitation on
the exercise of the right concerned and lay down clear and precise rules
governing the scope and application of the measure in question and
imposing minimum safeguards.82

The Court went even further, stating that the collection done
under Executive Order 12333 (“E.O. 12333”)83 also failed that same
proportionality test:
80

Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd (Schrems II),
ECLI:EU:C: 2020:559, passim (July 16, 2020).
81
Id. at ¶¶ 179–80.
82
Id.
83
See Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 8, 1981). Executive
Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981, describes
the roles of the various U.S. intelligence agencies and makes clear that those
agencies have broad authority to collect data that is stored outside the U.S. and
does not relate to a U.S. person. Id.
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It should be added that PPD‑28, with which the application of the
programmes referred to in the previous two paragraphs must comply,
allows for ‘“bulk” collection . . . of a relatively large volume of signals
intelligence information or data under circumstances where the
Intelligence Community cannot use an identifier associated with a
specific target . . . to focus the collection’, as stated in a letter from the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence to the United States
Department of Commerce and to the International Trade Administration
from 21 June 2016, set out in Annex VI to the Privacy Shield Decision.
That possibility, which allows, in the context of the surveillance
programmes based on E.O. 12333, access to data in transit to the United
States without that access being subject to any judicial review, does not,
in any event, delimit in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the scope
of such bulk collection of personal data.
It follows therefore that neither Section 702 of the FISA, nor E.O. 12333,
read in conjunction with PPD‑28, correlates to the minimum safeguards
resulting, under EU law, from the principle of proportionality, with the
consequence that the surveillance
programmes based on those provisions cannot be regarded as limited to
what is strictly necessary.84

The Court’s discussion of E.O. 12333 is particularly remarkable,
as it covered collection by U.S. surveillance authorities of data
stored or transited outside of the U.S. geographic borders in a case
that specifically focused on the protection of data that Facebook
transfered to the United States. The Court appeared to rely upon the
theory that some of the collections under E.O. 12333 are in the
process of transiting to the United States, but it is unclear what basis
the CJEU had to reach that conclusion.85 The result of this broadened
scope of analysis is to judge all U.S. surveillance activity that could
potentially collect personal data of individuals in the EU, instead of
just whether the specific transfers by Facebook in Schrems’ case had
“essentially equivalent” protection as what would have been granted
under European law.86
The second topic the Court disagreed with in Litt’s letter was
whether Europeans had sufficient access to an independent tribunal
84

Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd (Schrems II),
ECLI:EU:C: 2020:559, ¶¶ 183–84 (July 16, 2020).
85
See id.
86
Id. at ¶ 185.
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for them to demand access to the personal data collected by the U.S.
government, as well as the ability for Europeans to request the
deletion or correction of that data.87 The Court noted that while the
requirements of PPD-28 applied, those requirements did “not grant
data subjects actionable rights before the courts against the U.S.
authorities. Therefore, the Privacy Shield Decision cannot ensure a
level of protection essentially equivalent to that arising from the
Charter.”88 The Court went on to state that for surveillance done
under E.O. 12333, “it is clear from the file before the Court that that
order does not confer rights which are enforceable against the U.S.
authorities in the courts either.”89 The Court then noted the
requirement of enforceable redress for individuals by quoting
Recital 104 of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),
which states that, “the data subjects should be provided with
effective and enforceable rights and effective administrative and
judicial redress.”90
Going one step further, the Court then focused on the need for
redress in the context of international data transfers:
The existence of such effective redress in the third country concerned is
of particular importance in the context of the transfer of personal data to
that third country, since, as is apparent from recital 116 of the GDPR,
data subjects may find that the administrative and judicial authorities of
the Member States have insufficient powers and means to take effective
action in relation to data subjects’ complaints based on allegedly
unlawful processing, in that third country, of their data thus transferred,
which is capable of compelling them to resort to the national authorities
and courts of that third country.91

Finally, the Court concluded that the surveillance authorities at
issue did not provide effective redress mechanisms:
Furthermore, as regards both the surveillance programmes based on
Section 702 of the FISA and those based on E.O. 12333, it has been noted
in paragraphs 181 and 182 above that neither PPD‑28 nor E.O. 12333
grants data subjects rights actionable in the courts against the US

87

Id. at ¶ 181.
Id.
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Id. at ¶ 182.
90
Id. at ¶ 188 (quoting Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Parliament and of the
Council, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) 104).
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Id. at ¶ 189.
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authorities, from which it follows that data subjects have no right to an
effective remedy.92

The Court explicitly rejected the U.S. government’s assertion
that the creation of the Ombudsperson in the State Department
would satisfy the level of essential equivalence to meet the standard
of an effective redress mechanism, as it found that the
Ombudsperson was not sufficiently independent.93 Unfortunately,
the CJEU did not provide much detail on what mechanisms could
be put in place to make the Ombudsperson sufficiently independent
to satisfy the requirement.94 The relevant text of the opinion focuses
on the fact that the Secretary of State has the ability to dismiss or
revoke the appointment of the Ombudsperson.95 Notably, the United
States does have its own forms of independent regulatory agencies,
such as the FTC. However, it is unclear whether the FTC would have
sufficient independence to pass the Court’s standard as a home for
the Ombudsperson. It is also unclear how much weight the Court
would give to other potential safeguards that could be put in place
to restrict the ability of a U.S. executive agency to dismiss the
Ombudsperson.96
The Court continued, stating that the Ombudsperson is not only
insufficiently independent, but the Ombudsperson also does not
have enough authority to provide effective redress for individuals in
the EU:
Similarly, as the Advocate General stated, in point 338 of his Opinion,
although recital 120 of the Privacy Shield Decision refers to a
commitment from the US Government that the relevant component of
the intelligence services is required to correct any violation of the
applicable rules detected by the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, there is
nothing in that decision to indicate that that ombudsperson has the power
to adopt decisions that are binding on those intelligence services and
does not mention any legal safeguards that would accompany that
political commitment on which data subjects could rely.97
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Therefore, the ombudsperson mechanism to which the Privacy Shield
Decision refers does not provide any cause of action before a body which
offers the persons whose data is transferred to the United States
guarantees essentially equivalent to those required by Article 47 of the
Charter.98

The Court’s language on these three issues—(1) bulk versus
targeted collection; (2) access to a judicial tribunal; and (3) the
independence and authority of the redress mechanism—provides a
roadmap to analyze what could be deemed sufficient protections in
situations where national security agencies access personal data
collected by private sector companies and transfer that data to
another country.
Reactions to the Schrems II decision came quickly. U.S.
Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, noted his desire to continue
conversations with the EU to allow for continued data transfers:
While the Department of Commerce is deeply disappointed that the court
appears to have invalidated the European Commission’s adequacy
decision underlying the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, we are still studying the
decision to fully understand its practical impacts,” said Secretary Wilbur
Ross. “We have been and will remain in close contact with the European
Commission and European Data Protection Board on this matter and
hope to be able to limit the negative consequences to the $7.1 trillion
transatlantic economic relationship that is so vital to our respective
citizens, companies, and governments. Data flows are essential not just
to tech companies—but to businesses of all sizes in every sector. As our
economies continue their post-COVID-19 recovery, it is critical that
companies—including the 5,300+ current Privacy Shield participants—
be able to transfer data without interruption, consistent with the strong
protections offered by Privacy Shield.99

U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, also conveyed a desire to
work with the EU to find an acceptable mechanism to allow the
continued transatlantic flow of data that enables economic
development for both the United States and EU member states:
The United States and the EU have a shared interest in protecting
individual privacy and ensuring the continuity of commercial data
98

Id. at ¶ 197.
Press Release, Wilbur Ross, U.S. Sec’y of Com., U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Wilbur Ross Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of
EU-U.S. Data Flows (July 16, 2020), https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/index.
php/news/press-releases/2020/07/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-statementschrems-ii-ruling-and.html [https://perma.cc/9LM9-E3ZW].
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transfers. Uninterrupted data flows are essential to economic growth and
innovation, for companies of all sizes and in every sector, which is
particularly crucial now as both our economies recover from the effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic. This decision directly impacts both
European companies doing business in the United States as well as
American companies, of which over 70 percent are small and medium
enterprises. The United States will continue to work closely with the EU
to find a mechanism to enable the essential unimpeded commercial
transfer of data from the EU to the United States.100

In a similar fashion, EU officials have made public statements
of working collaboratively with the U.S. government to find a
solution. European Commission Vice-President Věra Jourová
commented, “we will be working closely with our American
counterparts, based on today’s ruling. Both Didier and I have been
in contact with U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in the past
days.”101
Vice President Jourova then continued her statement to include
the principles for further cooperation when she added:
[O]ur priorities are very clear: One: Guaranteeing the protection of
personal data transferred across the Atlantic; Two: Working
constructively with our American counterparts with an aim of ensuring
safe transatlantic data flows. [and] Three: Working with the European
Data Protection Board and national data protection authorities to ensure
our international data transfer toolbox is fit for purpose.”102

EU Commissioner of Justice Didier Reynders struck the same
tone when he noted that the United States and the EU should work
together “constructively,” while “(i)n the meantime, transatlantic
data flows between companies can continue using other mechanisms
for international transfers . . . .”103
100
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The U.S. government and some experts have reacted to the
Schrems II ruling with recommendations for specific paths
forward.104 In September of 2020, the U.S. Department of
Commerce issued a detailed white paper analyzing the judgment and
offering several opportunities to support a new analysis.105 The white
paper makes the following three key points:
(1) Most U.S. companies do not deal in data that is of any interest to
U.S. intelligence agencies, and have no grounds to believe they do.
They are not engaged in data transfers that present the type of risks
to privacy that appear to have concerned the ECJ in Schrems II.
(2) The U.S. government frequently shares intelligence information
with EU Member States, including data disclosed by companies in
response to FISA 702 orders, to counter threats such as terrorism,
weapons proliferation, and hostile foreign cyber activity. Sharing of
FISA 702 information undoubtedly serves important EU public
interests by protecting the governments and people of the Member
States.
(3) There is a wealth of public information about privacy protections in
U.S. law concerning government access to data for national security
purposes, including information not recorded in Decision
2016/1250, new developments that have occurred since 2016, and
information the ECJ neither considered nor addressed. Companies
may wish to take this information into account in any assessment of
U.S. law post-Schrems II.106

The white paper’s second point above may be a consideration
outside the Schrems Court’s reach, but it is worthy of consideration
as the United States and the EU develop a path forward, and it could
be important in the analysis of whether the surveillance programs’
data collection are proportionate to the purpose of enhancing
104

Kenneth Propp & Peter Swire, Geopolitical Implications of the European
Court’s Schrems II Decision, LAWFARE (July 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
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TO SCCS AND OTHER EU LEGAL BASES FOR EU-U.S. DATA TRANSFERS AFTER
SCHREMS II (2020), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/SCCs
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national security and thereby protecting civil liberties from
incursion by malicious actors. Experts have previously pointed out
that national security surveillance and intelligence analysis provides
protections for individuals that help protect the fundamental human
rights in the Charter.107 The processing of personal data is often
necessary to protect privacy, as scanning internet network traffic can
identify and prevent malicious cybersecurity attacks that would
otherwise result in the stealing of sensitive personal data.108
The white paper’s third key point suggests that a more detailed
review of U.S. surveillance laws, policies, and practices is necessary
to properly determine whether the U.S. system is “essentially
equivalent” with that of the EU.109 With specific focus on Section
702, the white paper argues that the Schrems II decision was
incorrect in determining that surveillance under the section is not
targeted.110 In support of the U.S. model, the paper notes that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), a body composed
of “life-tenured federal judges,” must approve and enforce Section
702 targeting procedures.111 The paper then offers points in
opposition to the Schrems II ruling that the United States does not
provide adequate access for individuals in the EU to seek redress for
violations of Section 702, offering the following three specific
statutes that provide such access:
1. Section 1810 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2018).
2. Section 2712 of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2018).

107
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3. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2018).112
After the discussion of redress, the paper describes changes
made under U.S. law to enhance the privacy protections in, and
oversight of, surveillance conducted under Section 702.113 Finally,
the paper points out the peculiarity of the Court’s analysis of E.O.
12333 since that is an authority for overseas collection and,
“[u]nlike FISA 702 . . . E.O. 12333 does not authorize the U.S.
government to require any company or person to disclose data.”114
The additional information provided on redress, the clarification on
E.O. 12333, and the new protections could justify a different
decision on “essential equivalence” and support discussions
between the EU and United States on a replacement data transfer
mechanism for the Privacy Shield.
Privacy experts have also offered opinions on the Schrems II
ruling and options for future modifications that could cure the
deficiencies noted by the Schrems II Court.115 Stewart Baker, former
Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, has referred to the Court’s ruling as “gobsmacking in its
mix of judicial imperialism and Eurocentric hypocrisy.” Among
other proposals, he believes the United States should use trade
sanctions to force the EU to amend its operating treaty and law to
better accommodate the international transfer of data.116 Baker has
been outspoken in his belief that EU member state surveillance

112
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practices cannot satisfy the same standards that have been applied
in the Schrems II opinion.117
It is unfortunate that the Schrems II opinion does not provide an
overview of existing European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
case law that has examined the proportionality of surveillance
practices in light of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“Convention”), specifically, Article 8 of that treaty.118 This lack of
analysis is all the more surprising, as Article 52, Section 3 of the
Charter explicitly states the rights and the “meaning and scope” of
the rights should be the same as those in the Convention.119
Commentators have observed a recent pattern of the CJEU
increasingly failing to look to the separate ECHR case law to help
interpret the Charter.120
The Convention is an instrument of the Council of Europe,
which is not an EU institution, although all of the EU member states
have adopted the Convention.121 Unlike the Charter, the Convention
does explicitly apply to national security surveillance, and there is a
growing body of case law to determine when surveillance programs
violate the Convention’s right to respect for privacy.122 Section 2 of
Article 8 specifically states:

117

See Tech Pol’y Podcast, #19: Europocrisy: EU Privacy Hypocrisy with
Stewart Baker, TECHFREEDOM, at 20:55 (Feb. 9, 2016), https://techfreedom.org/
19-europocrisy-eu-privacy-hypocrisy-with-stewart-baker/ [https://perma.cc/AQ33JN6J].
118
2012 O.J. (C 326) 397.
119
Id. at 406 (“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to
rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same
as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union
law providing more extensive protection.”).
120
Martin Kuijer, The Challenging Relationship Between the European
Convention on Human Rights and the EU Legal Order: Consequences of a
Delayed Accession, 24 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 998, 1001–02 (2020).
121
What is the European Convention on Human Rights?, EQUAL. & HUM. RTS.
COMM’N, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/what-european-conventionhuman-rights [https://perma.cc/5E6Q-F443] (last updated Apr. 17, 2017).
122
See EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., PRESS UNIT, MASS SURVEILLANCE 1 (2020),
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/fs_mass_surveillance_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HZ7F-GXLE].
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Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.123

It is the inclusion of the phrase “necessary in a democratic
society” that provides the ECHR the need to assess the
proportionality of surveillance’s impact on privacy. The CJEU
could also look to EU member state court examinations of whether
surveillance programs have been proportionate in light of member
state constitutions and laws, such as in the recent German
Bundesnachrichtendienst Act case.124 In that case, the court found
substantial, but not unlimited, latitude was necessary to safeguard
national security interests.125
Also, the EU institutions are increasingly narrowing the scope
of national security within which they will defer to member states.126
In two cases decided subsequent to Schrems II, the CJEU
determined that “indiscriminate data retention” requirements by
nation states can be justified by national security concerns, but the
decisions must be reviewed by a court or independent tribunal.127
The developments in the CJEU, the ECHR and member state courts,
and the arguments that the Schrems II opinion did not include a full
123
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005.
124
BVERFG, HEADNOTES TO THE JUDGEMENT OF THE FIRST SENATE OF 19 MAY
2020 - 1 BVR 2835/17 (2020) https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2020/05/rs20200519_1bvr283517en.pdf;jsessionid
=23960014948D3CA040679C991345EF38.1_cid386?__blob=publicationFile&
v=4 [https://perma.cc/T8BL-AHN8].
125
Id.at 49–50.
126
See Monika Zalnieriute, The Future of Data Retention Regimes and National
Security in the EU After the Quadrature Du Net and Privacy International
Judgments, 24 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS, Nov. 5, 2020, at 4,
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ASIL_Insights_2020_V24_I28.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HVL-4GJB].
127
Id. at 1, 3.
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analysis of the privacy protections in the U.S. system all support that
there may be an opportunity for a new agreement between the
United States and the European Commission to satisfy the CJEU’s
implementation of the essential equivalence standard. That
opportunity may be enhanced by additional changes the United
States can make without increasing national security risks.
Professors Peter Swire and Kenneth Propp authored a
particularly interesting proposal to address “two dimensions: a
credible fact-finding inquiry into classified surveillance activities in
order to ensure protection of the individual’s rights, and the
possibility of appeal to an independent judicial body that can remedy
any violation of rights should it occur.”128 Their recommendation
would utilize the fact-finding ability of U.S. government agency
privacy and civil liberties officers while allowing for judicial
appeals to the FISC.129
The messages of cooperation from U.S. and EU officials noted
above signal a desire for conversations about what legal framework
is necessary to allow global companies to be able to transfer data
while government agencies pursue their needs to access that
information for legitimate national security and law enforcement
purposes. Any resulting framework, however, will be more useful if
it applies to more than just access by U.S. government agencies to
information held in the United States by domestic companies.
Companies from other countries also have a need for international
data flows, and those countries will have to demonstrate that their
privacy protections provide the requisite level of protection to
individuals.130
Given the international reach and rapid growth of Chinese
technology companies and services such as Huawei, Alibaba, Baidu,
Tencent, ZTE, and TikTok,131 public policy stakeholders are turning
their attention to the degree to which those companies transfer data
128

Propp & Swire, supra note 104.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Jaime Henriquez, The Big Seven: China’s Up-and-Coming Technology
Companies, TECHREPUBLIC, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/the-big-sevenchinas-up-and-coming-technology-companies/ [https://perma.cc/6DK2-TXKZ] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2021).
129
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back to China, and how readily the Chinese government can access
that data once it is there.132 The current dispute between the U.S.
government and TikTok’s parent company, Bytedance, is an
instructive example of how discussions similar to those in the
Schrems cases are playing out in the U.S.-China relationship.
III.
TIKTOK AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
On January 5, 2021, President Trump issued an executive order
(“EO”) prohibiting transactions with eight Chinese technology
applications, including “Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet,
SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office.”133
That EO included an explanation of the specific threat to national
security that it intended to address:
By accessing personal electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets,
and computers, Chinese connected software applications can access and
capture vast swaths of information from users, including sensitive
personally identifiable information and private information. This data
collection threatens to provide the Government of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with access to
Americans’ personal and proprietary information — which would permit
China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, and
build dossiers of personal information.134

The January 5, 2021 EO was substantially similar to two Trump
Administration actions that received much more press attention: the
August 6, 2020 EO (“IEEPA Order”)135 and the August 14, 2020 EO
132
Robert D. Williams, Beyond Huawei and TikTok: Untangling US Concerns
Over Chinese Tech Companies and Digital Security 30–31(unpublished working
paper), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201030_
huawei_tiktok_williams.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QXK-QXTR].
133
Exec. Order No. 13,971, 86 Fed. Reg. 1,249, 1,250 (Jan. 8, 2021).
134
Id. at 1,249.
135
Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 11, 2020); Sam Byford,
Trump’s WeChat Ban Could Touch Everything From Spotify to League of
Legends, VERGE (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:13 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/8/7/21358252/tencent-wechat-ban-trump-executive-order-consequences
[https://perma.cc/PYC5-TD2C] (explaining the IEEPA order also accompanied a
similar Executive Order banning transactions with the application WeChat and its
parent company Tencent, which could have even greater significance due to
Tencent’s diverse business holdings including investments in Spotify, Riot
Games, Epic Games, and Supercell).
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(“CFIUS Order”).136 The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (“IEEPA”) is the authority that President Trump used
for the IEEPA Order.137 IEEPA authorizes the President of the
United States to impose sanctions on any foreign entity during a
declared “national emergency.”138 The IEEPA Order relied upon a
prior May 15, 2019 EO that had declared a national emergency due
to cybersecurity hacking from “foreign adversaries.”139
The IEEPA Order included similar language to the January 5th
Order describing the risks of Chinese government access to the
personal data of U.S. citizens:
TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users,
including Internet and other network activity information such as
location data and browsing and search histories. This data collection
threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’
personal and proprietary information — potentially allowing China to
track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers
of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate
espionage.140

The IEEPA Order bans any company within the jurisdiction of
the United States from entering into transactions with TikTok or its
parent company ByteDance Ltd., and requires the Commerce
Department to identify any prohibited transactions.141
The CFIUS Order relied on a different Presidential authority.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(“CFIUS”) was established under Section 721 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950 and then strengthened by regulations to
implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act
of 2018.142 CFIUS creates an interagency committee to review
136

Order Regarding the Acquisition of Musical.ly by ByteDance Ltd., 85 Fed.
Reg. 51,297 (Aug. 14, 2020).
137
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C §§ 1701–1706.
138
Id. at § 1702.
139
Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
140
Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637, 48,637 (Aug. 11, 2020).
141
Id. at 48637–38.
142
31 C.F.R. § 800 (2020); The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-statescfius [https://perma.cc/YR8L-8JDB] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
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transactions involving foreign investment in the United States.143 A
U.S. company does not need to be involved in the transaction, as
long as one of the parties is involved in interstate commerce in the
United States that threatens to impair national security.144 If a
company does not get prior approval from CFIUS for a transaction,
the law allows the committee to impose sanctions, including
requiring unwinding the transaction after the fact.145
The CFIUS Order calls out that ByteDance Ltd. (a Cayman
Islands corporation) purchased Musical.ly (another Cayman Islands
corporation) and then merged ByteDance’s TikTok operations into
Musical.ly.146 The sanctions in the CFIUS Order require ByteDance
to divest itself of the operation of TikTok in the United States and
any data provided by TikTok or Musical.ly U.S. users.147 ByteDance
was given ninety days, with a possible extension of another thirty
days, to divest both the business and the data.148
On September 18, 2020, the Commerce Department issued a
statement describing the TikTok transactions that would be
prohibited under the IEEPA Order.149 That statement prohibited
online application stores from allowing users to download the
TikTok application or software updates to previously downloaded
versions of the application.150 In addition, the Commerce
Department disallowed several other types of companies from
playing a role in assisting TikTok, including internet hosting

143
CFIUS Overview, DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-statescfius/cfius-overview [https://perma.cc/2FM9-28MQ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
144
31 CFR § 800.101 (2020).
145
Id.
146
Order Regarding the Acquisition of Musical.ly by ByteDance Ltd, 85 Fed.
Reg. 51,297 (Aug. 19, 2020).
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Peter Jeydel, et. al., US Commerce Department Identifies Prohibited
Transactions Involiving WeChat and TikTok, STEPTOE (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.steptoeinternationalcomplianceblog.com/2020/09/us-commercedepartment-identifies-prohibited-transactions-involving-wechat-and-tiktok/
[https://perma.cc/DF22-ZSVU].
150
Id.
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companies, content delivery services, and transit and peering
capability.151
However, the IEEPA Order started several lawsuits, including
multiple requests for preliminary injunctions.152 At the same time,
TikTok issued a statement describing the considerable efforts they
had taken to address the issues raised by the U.S. government and
to demonstrate that they should be trusted to operate in the United
States.153 Concurrently, TikTok pursued relationships with U.S.
companies to resolve the issues, including a potential arrangement
with Oracle and Walmart.154 Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross
issued a statement on September 19, 2020, reacting positively to the
proposed solution with Oracle and Walmart and delaying
implementation of the sanctions until September 27, 2020.155
Judge Carl J. Nichols granted TikTok a request for the injunction
on September 27, 2020.156 Judge Nichols’ opinion provides more
insight into the reasoning of the Department of Commerce when it
quotes an internal Commerce Department memo saying:
Before issuing those prohibited transactions, the Secretary reviewed and
relied on a decision memorandum that assessed the threats posed by
ByteDance and TikTok . . . In particular, the Secretary of Commerce,
found that the PRC is “building massive databases of Americans’
personal information” to help the “Chinese government to further its
intelligence-gathering and to understand more about who to target for
espionage, whether electronically or via human recruitment.”157

151

Id.
Katy Stech Ferek & Georgia Wells, TikTok Files Another Lawsuit to Block
Ban on App, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-filesanother-lawsuit-to-block-ban-on-app-11600541730 [https://perma.cc/7WBB-ZZ5J].
153
Why We are Suing the Administration, TIKTOK, supra note 1.
154
Vanessa Pappas, An Update for our TikTok Family, TIKTOK (Sept. 19,
2020), https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/an-update-for-our-tiktok-family
[https://perma.cc/4Z4G-P9QS].
155
Makena Kelly & Kim Lyons, Preisdent Trump Says He Approves of
Oracle’s Bid for TikTok ‘in Concept’, THE VERGE (Sept. 19, 2020, 5:55 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/19/21437850/president-trump-approvesoracle-tiktok-partnership-bytedance-china-ban [https://perma.cc/SL2F-D5CX].
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TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-CV-02658, 2020 WL 5763634, at *1 (D.D.C.
Sept. 27, 2020).
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Id. at *3.
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The opinion further describes the Administration’s position for
why these risks apply to TikTok:
The Secretary also found that the CCP will exploit “close ties” with
ByteDance to further its foreign policy agenda . . . ByteDance is
headquartered in Beijing and remains subject to the PRC’s National
Intelligence Law, which “permits Chinese intelligence institutions” to
“take control of” any China-based firm’s “facilities” and
“communications equipment.” . . . ByteDance has signed a cooperation
agreement with a PRC security agency, closed one of its media platforms
in response to CCP demands, and (as of August 2020) placed over 130
CCP committee members in management positions throughout the
company . . . And because “ByteDance is subject to PRC jurisdiction,
[and] PRC laws can compel cooperation from ByteDance, regardless of
whether ByteDance’s subsidiaries are located outside the territory of the
PRC,” the data held by ByteDance’s subsidiary companies may also be
extracted by the PRC.158

On October 30, 2020, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania also issued an injunction against
imposition of the IEEPA Order sanctions.159 Both issued injunctions
include language calling into question whether the U.S. government
will be successful using IEEPA against TikTok.160 At the time this
Article was written, it is still unclear whether the Biden
Administration will continue with the litigation to pursue action
against TikTok, will enforce the CFIUS Order, or whether they will
revoke the EOs. However, even if the orders are revoked, the
underlying risks remain.
Concerns about the national security implications of the Chinese
government’s access to large amounts of personal information of
Americans is not a new issue. Experts have expressed concerns
going back at least to the 2017 hack of Equifax161 and the 2015 theft

158

Id.
Maryland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 WL 6381397 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30,
2020).
160
Id. at *8–9; TikTok, 2020 WL5763634 at *3.
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Brian Barrett, How 4 Chinese Hackers Allegedly Took Down Equifax,
WIRED (Feb. 10, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-hackchina/ [https://perma.cc/TZ2S-KVMB].
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of data from the Office of Personnel Management.162 What made the
concerns about TikTok different was the idea that the Chinese
government would not have to illegally obtain the data, but could
just demand the information from TikTok under Chinese law.163
There are three specific Chinese laws that point to risk that the
Chinese government could demand access to information of
individuals from the United States that is stored in China, or require
TikTok to make changes in its software to transfer such data from
the United States back to China (and then to the Chinese
government). These three laws are the Cybersecurity Law of 2017
(“Cybersecurity Law”),164 the Counterrorism Law of 2015
(“Counterrorism Law”),165 and the National Security Law of 2015
(“National Security Law”).166 Article 28 of the Cybersecurity Law
provides:
Network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to
public security organs and national security organs that are safeguarding
national security and investigating criminal activities in accordance with
the law.167

Similar language requiring cooperation by private companies is
included in Articles 9 and 84 of the Counterrorism Law:
All units and individuals have the obligation to assist and cooperate with
relevant government authorities in carrying out counter-terrorism efforts,
and where discovering suspected terrorist activities or suspected terrorist
individuals, shall promptly report to the public security organs or
relevant departments.168
162
Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked the US
Government, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/
10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/ [https://perma.cc/DUS2-X2FG].
163
Richie Koch, TikTok and the Privacy Perils of China’s First International
Social Media Platform, PROTON MAIL (July 23, 2020), https://protonmail.com/
blog/tiktok-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/D8J2-X72S].
164
Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 6, 2016, effective June 1, 2017) (China).
165
Counter-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2015, effective Jan. 1, 2016)
(China).
166
National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 2015) (China).
167
Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 28 (China).
168
Counter-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China, at art. 9.
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In any of the following circumstances, the competent departments shall
fine telecommunications operators or internet service providers between
200,000 and 500,000 yuan, and fine directly responsible managers and
other directly responsible personnel up to 100,000 yuan; where
circumstances are serious, the fine is 500,000 or more, and directly
responsible managers and other directly responsible personnel are fined
between 100,000 and 500,000 yuan, and the public security organs may
detain directly responsible managers and other directly responsible
personnel for between five and fifteen days:
(1) Not providing technical interfaces, decryption and other technical
support assistance to public security organs and state security organs
conducting prevention and investigation of terrorist activities in
accordance with law.
(2) Not following a competent department’s request to stop
transmission, delete information that has terrorist or extremist
content, store relevant records, or to close down relevant websites,
or shut down related services;
(3) Not putting into place systems for network security and supervision
of information content, technological security precautionary
measures, causing the transmission of information with terrorist or
extremist content; where the circumstances are serious.169

The National Security law also includes sweeping language
requiring assistance from Chinese companies, including in the
collection of intelligence:
Article 53: The carrying out of intelligence information efforts shall fully
utilize contemporary scientific and technical techniques, strengthening
the distinction, screening, synthesis and analytic assessment of
intelligence information.170
Article 77: Citizens and organizations shall perform the following
obligations to preserve national security.
(1) Obeying the relevant provisions of the Constitution, laws, and
regulations regarding national security;
(2) Promptly reporting leads on activities endangering national security;
(3) Truthfully providing evidence they become aware of related to
activities endangering national security;
(4) Providing conditions to facilitate national security efforts and other
assistance;
(5) Providing public security organs, state security organs or relevant
military organs with necessary support and assistance;
169
170

Id. at art. 84.
National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, at art. 53.
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(6) Keeping state secrets they learn of confidential [sic];
(7) Other duties provided by law or administrative regulations.

Individuals and organizations must not act to endanger national
security and must not provide any kind of support or assistance to
individuals or organizations endangering national security.171
These vague legal requirements are difficult to interpret. Are
Chinese authorities regularly requiring technology companies to
provide intelligence assistance, including the inclusion of
backdoors, the provision of personal data, the moderation of content
on platforms to influence behavior of users, or the use of advanced
analytics to analyze information and to supplement information
obtained through direct government offensive cybersecurity attacks
and other methods like purchasing information from data brokers?
Some commentators, such as leading cybersecurity policy expert
Samm Sacks, point to the fact that there is little evidence of the
Chinese government demanding such assistance from companies.172
Sacks points to examples of Chinese companies resisting requests
from the Chinese government and notes the important interests these
companies and the Chinese government have in governments and
users around the world trusting Chinese technology products and
services.173
On July 9, 2020, TikTok published a transparency report that
explicitly stated that they had not received any requests for
information from the Chinese government.174 However, Sacks noted
that the vagueness of these Chinese legal requirements and the lack
of legal structures would not provide trust and confidence: “In China
there is no guarantee that the government cannot access data because
China’s system lacks clarity of law, oversight mechanisms and clear
pathways for contestation.”175
171

Id. at art. 77.
Samm Sacks, Data Security and U.S.-China Tech Entanglement, LAWFARE
(Apr. 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-security-and-uschina-tech-entanglement [https://perma.cc/5DBN-T53X].
173
Id.
174
TikTok Transparency Report 2019 H2, TIKTOK (July 9, 2020),
https://www.tiktok.com/safety/resources/transparency-report?lang=en&appLaunch=
[https://perma.cc/A49E-WQRQ].
175
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Both the U.S. and Chinese governments have the legal ability to
require companies to provide them with personal data of citizens of
other countries. While that ability is also likely true for many
countries, the success and global reach of U.S. and Chinese
technology companies makes the issue more prominent with respect
to companies like Facebook and TikTok. The data collected by
Facebook and TikTok has the potential to create both privacy
concerns for individuals and national security risks. The United
States and the EU are not the only countries addressing these issues.
Recently, India decided to ban the use of many Chinese phone
applications over similar concerns.176 As in the Schrems cases, the
EU has attempted to address these concerns about U.S. access to
data transferred to other countries with enforcement of the
requirements of the Directive and GDPR. The United States has
attempted to address similar issues with EOs, CFIUS and IEEPA.
However, the legal environments in the United States and China are
not equivalent.
The United States has a highly detailed set of legal protections
for privacy and an independent federal judiciary, while China is still
developing many of its similar institutions.177 The question remains
of how governments should evaluate whether those systems (or
others) are robust enough to trust technology that could transfer
data. If not, then, what criteria should be used? The World Justice
Project Rule of Law Index ranks the United States as twenty-first in
the world and China eighty-eighth for adherence to the rule of law.178
That index evaluates the following seven factors: (1) constraints on
government powers; (2) absence of corruption; (3) open
government; (4) fundamental rights; (5) order and security;
(6) regulatory enforcement; and (7) civil justice.179 Is it possible to
176

Saheli Roy Choudhury, China is an Opportunity for India — Not a Threat,
Beijing Says as More Apps are Banned, CNBC (Nov. 26, 2020, 11:57 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/26/china-responds-to-india-banning-43additional-chinese-apps.html [https://perma.cc/6HVN-DFLY].
177
Overcoming Embeddedness: How China’s Judicial Accountability Reforms
Make its Judges More Autonmous, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 737, 763–65 (2020).
178
WJP Rule of Law Index, WORLD JUST. PROJECT (2020),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2020 [https://perma.cc/FHV3BJKV].
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develop similar solutions and criteria for the oversight of
government engagement with technology companies to properly
evaluate what technologies should be allowed market access?
IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
Many U.S. surveillance law and policy experts have expressed
doubts about the Schrems I and II decisions.180 One of the concerns
they note is that if the robust U.S. system of intelligence community
oversight and commitment to privacy protections are insufficient,
then is it unlikely that any other country will be able to meet the
court’s standard of “essential equivalence.”181 While the Schrems II
decision states that Standard Contractual Clauses may still be used
to transfer data in some situations, the court’s reasoning calls into
question whether that will be true for any significant technology
service that allows for large quantities of personal data to be
accessed and analyzed by government agencies. It is quite possible
that Binding Corporate Rules182 may also fail such a test, since there
is nothing inherent in those provisions that can limit the access to
data by government agencies.
Therefore, the Court’s Schrems decisions should not just call
into question transfers of personal data from the EU to the United
States, but also transfers to countries that have robust surveillance
practices, but even less transparency, access to tribunals, or legally
enforceable privacy protections. This list of countries should include
Russia, India, Israel, Brazil, Turkey, Singapore, Vietnam, and

180

As an example, see Joshua P. Meltzer, Why Schrems II Requires US-EU
Agreement on Surveillance and Privacy, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2020)
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/why-schrems-ii-requires-us-euagreement-on-surveillance-and-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/4JMK-U5E7].
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Propp & Swire, supra note 104.
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Another mechanism for transfer under the Directive and the General Data
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privacy regulators. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 108,
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China.183 If the three issues noted in the Schrems II decision,
including (1) bulk versus targeted collection; (2) access to a judicial
tribunal; and (3) the independence and authority of the redress
mechanism, are applied to the transfer of data from the EU to these
other countries, then the EU may become a digital island. However,
the impact would be well beyond just digital services, as most
companies rely upon the transfer of personal data to provide goods
and other non-digital services. It is quite conceivable that the natural
extension of the Schrems II decision would be to substantially limit
European access to essential items, such as oil and natural gas, as it
would be extremenly difficult to transact business without some
exchange of personal data between the business participants.184
Likewise, the U.S. approach to TikTok focuses on the possibility
of the corporate parent using the software update functionality to
begin to export personal data back to China.185 Similar to the recent
SolarWinds cybersecurity attack, automated software updates can
be used by nation states to introduce code that can do a variety of
things, including exfiltrating data.186 However, the timely
installation of software updates is also critical to patch known
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.187 In theory, the rapid implementation
183

See 2017 SURVEILLANCE LAW COMPARISON LAW GUIDE, BAKER MCKENZIE
(2017), https://tmt.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/minisites/tmt/files/2017_
surveillance_law.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/M475-BA4F].
184
See From Where do We Import Energy and How Dependent are We?,
EUROSTAT, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html
[https://perma.cc/QC74-JRNB] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
185
Justin Sherman, Unpacking TikTok, Mobil Apps and National Security
Risks, LAWFARE (Apr. 2, 2020, 10:06 AM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/
unpacking-tiktok-mobile-apps-and-national-security-risks [https://perma.cc/D7YV5B88].
186
The updated code can be used to collect information from the service and
send it to another location, such as government servers within China. Laura
Hautala, SolarWinds Not the Only Company Used to Hack Targets, Tech Execs
Say at Hearing, CNET (Feb. 24, 2021, 2:56 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/
solarwinds-hack-officially-blamed-on-russia-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://
perma.cc/7WD7-KMGH].
187
How Malicious Software Updates Endanger Everyone, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/consumer-privacy/howmalicious-software-updates-endanger-everyone [https://perma.cc/Y38A-F2WX]
(last visited Apr. 16, 2021).
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of software updates makes the entire digital infrastructure more
secure.188 Invalidating the ability for software updates to come from
other countries to the United States could have the end result of
making the United States less secure.189
Both the Schrems cases and the TikTok issues boil down to a
question of whether the technology can be trusted not to provide
information to government agencies in a way that will cause harm
to individuals and/or society. Evaluating the security of a given
technology requires establishing criteria and standards to determine
whether governments and individuals should trust the technology
and the countries in which data will be stored. As noted in the prior
sections of this Article, the Court in the Schrems cases attempts to
lay out criteria for what would justify trust. While not necessary for
the legal analysis in the cases, it is interesting to note that many EU
countries’ surveillance frameworks would likely not satisfy the
criteria used by the Court.190 The U.S. government’s action against
TikTok asserts that technology from China should not be trusted to
process large amounts of personal data.191 If other countries were to
adopt the approach taken by the Trump administration towards
TikTok, then given the decreasing global trust in the U.S.
government and U.S. technology companies, there is a significant
risk to market access barriers for U.S. companies.192 The potential
188
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190
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end result of these approaches could be that a country would only
trust software developed, sold, and updated from within the borders
of that country.
A different approach is needed. A new approach in regulating
technology could involve an evaluation of criteria from three
categories: (1) a technical analysis of the technology; (2) company
commitments made public and legal mechanisms for the
government to enforce those promises; and (3) a determination of
whether current legal privacy protections, oversight of law
enforcement, and agency surveillance activities suffice.
In the first category of technical analysis, significant academic
research continues on how to measure the trustworthiness of
technology and to identify cybersecurity issues.193 Conversations
around the need for testing and certification continue around the
world.194 While many companies express concern with mandatory
certification regimes,195 there is begrudging acceptance and
guidance from companies on how to implement such regimes so
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194
See Aaron Boyd, DOD Will Require Vendor Cybersecurity Certifications By
This Time Next Year, NEXTGOV (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/
cybersecurity/2019/09/dod-will-require-vendor-cybersecurity-certificationstime-next-year/159702/ [https://perma.cc/3TCF-KY32]; EU Cybersecurity
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they maximize effectiveness.196 In the absence of mandatory
certification, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (“NIST”) has led considerable work on voluntary
metrics for trustworthiness of software.197
The company commitments included in the second category
could consist of public disclosure of companies’ adoptions of secure
development lifecycle processes, risk management efforts, internal
and external audits, specific board oversight, policies on when the
company will object legally to government requests, and robust
enterprise information security programs. Whether companies have
implemented the NIST Cybersecurity Framework198 and the
ISO/IEC 27001 standard199 are highly relevant factors. Also, the U.S.
Department of Justice’s principles to evaluate corporate compliance
programs200 and guidance documents from the Information
Accountability Foundation201 both provide useful criteria to measure
responsible corporate behavior.
However, effective legal mechanisms for countries to enforce
those company promises would then be needed. The United States
has at least two such models with Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) oversight of statements of publicly traded

196
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companies202 and the FTC Act Section 5 authority for unfair and
deceptive trade practices.203 Creating an oversight mechanism to
evaluate company promises, like that of the SEC or FTC, is
necessary, but will be insufficient without robust, harmonized, and
predictable enforcement. Such enforcement requires substantial
funding, which has been noted by many experts as an issue for the
FTC.204
The third category of criteria will require a detailed examination
of the U.S. legal framework, including the Constitution, laws,
regulations, and judicial system. This type of analysis is what the
court in Schrems did but without a focus on what is a reasonable
standard to which all global governments should be held. Such an
effort would likely require a centralized global entity with
credibility to act as convener. One possible convener could be the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”).205 The OECD has tremendous credibility in the privacy
area from its work on the 1980 Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (“OECD
Guidelines”).206 Noted privacy expert Paula Bruening has famously
described the OECD Guidelines as the global common language of
privacy.207 The OECD has recently announced an effort to lead an
202
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analysis to “examine the possibility of developing, as a matter of
priority, high-level policy guidance for government access to
personal data held by the private sector.”208 The announcement
described in greater detail that the guidance may include:
[T]he legal bases upon which governments may compel access to
personal data; requirements that access meet legitimate aims and be
carried out in a necessary and proportionate manner; transparency;
approvals for and constraints placed on government access; limitations
on handling of personal data acquired, including confidentiality,
integrity and availability safeguards; independent oversight; and
effective redress.209

V. CONCLUSION
Technology has become fundamental to how individuals live
their lives. People around the globe use technology for work, leisure,
healthcare, personal finance, education, and to raise families.
However, the use of the technology that provides that value also
ushers in risks to privacy and security. Most commercially created
technology includes hardware, software, and services comprised of
component portions delivered as part of a complicated global
software and data supply chain. Disconnecting those supply chains
and requiring vertical technology supply chain integration within
each country will limit the effectiveness of the technology and the
benefits to individuals and countries. The Schrems II ruling and the
U.S. TikTok actions demonstrate the need for a global set of
trustworthiness criteria, and that work should begin now.
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